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Abstract
Most literature assessing the e¤ectiveness of competition policy focuses on
short term impacts, ignoring the likelihood that rms and market mechanisms
may take some time to respond to policy interventions. This paper adopts
a more dynamic perspective in the context of cartel detection by analysing
subsequent developments in market structures through merger. With data for
a sample of 84 EC cartels, it employs a novel application of recurrent event
survival analysis to establish that cartel breakdown is typically followed by
intensive merger activity. This is most likely for cartels which had been de-
tected via leniency applications and where concentration was relatively lower.
The paper also shows that in most markets where mergers do not occur, the
post-cartel structure is already consistent with potential dominance, and in a
number of those where it is not, the mergers move the market in that direction.
Surprisingly very few post-cartel mergers were intervened by the competition
authority, and this appears to be because many were individually small, but
cumulatively had signicant impact on concentration.
Keywords: tacit and overt collusion, mergers, long-term e¤ects, recurrent events,
survival analysis
JEL Classication codes: C41, L10, L41
1 Introduction
Anti-cartel enforcement is widely heralded as the single most important part of an-
titrust policy. For this reason it is somewhat surprising that there have only been
a few studies analysing how markets react to the elimination of cartels. This paper
takes a dynamic approach in examining what happens in markets in the years after
a competition authority has successfully prosecuted a cartel. It examines whether
markets revert to competitive behaviour or whether rms nd alternative ways of
reinstating collusive equilibria (short of cartelisation) in the longer run.
The most common approach to this question in the past has been to examine
post-cartel prices, and a fairly common method for quantifying cartel overcharge is
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to compare post-cartel against within cartel period prices. While such an approach
can sometimes be illuminating, suitable price data are often unavailable, especially
over anything more than the short-term. Here instead we turn to a more indirect
approach in order to use types of longer-run data which are more readily available,
namely on quantity and market structure. This follows the insight of seminal works
in the early 1990s by Sutton (1991), and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who showed,
using very di¤erent analytical approaches, how information about market shares and
structure can be informative about the competitive process, even without information
on price and prots.
Such market structure changes are often typically achieved in the form of mergers.
For this paper, data were collected on mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures (here-
after referred to under the catch-all merger) between rms involved in those cartels
for which the European Commission (EC) issued decision documents between 1990
and 2012. We pose three questions. Was there more intense merger activity amongst
the former cartelists in the years immediately following breakdown? Were certain
types of cartels more likely than others to be followed by merger? Is there evidence
that the CA subsequently intervened in those proposed mergers which were most
likely to raise potential anti-competitive concerns, or is there evidence of deterrence
of such mergers?
The task of establishing whether or not there was indeed a higher than normal
rate of mergers following breakdown is not straightforward, and the practical and
conceptual di¢ culties in applying a standard di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology
rule it out in this case. Our alternative is a novel application of survival analysis,
with the complication that there may be recurrent deaths (multiple mergers). This
establishes that there is indeed evidence of more intensive post-breakdown merger
activity, but especially for the subset of cartels which were detected via leniency
applications, and in relatively less concentrated markets. Our explanation is that
leniency applications are most common in cartels which have already, or are about
to, breakdown for natural causes(i.e. are internally unstable). It follows that formal
collusion has become unsustainable, and if so it is even less likely that the parties will
be able to e¤ectively collude tacitly (without formal communication). Mergers may
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then o¤er the best prospect for a restructuring which would be more conducive to
tacit collusion. However, there is another intuitive explanation of abnormal merger
activity post-breakdown in leniency cases this could be the natural means by which
rms restructure in the face of tougher price competition.
The second part of the paper looks for indirect evidence for discriminating be-
tween these explanations. It disaggregates and examines which rms do the acquiring
and who they acquire, in which types of market structure mergers were most com-
mon, and what were the implications of the mergers for the post-merger market
structures in terms of dominance. It also examines the response of the CA: which
mergers it investigated, and what were its decisions. Surprisingly, very few post-
cartel mergers were intervened by the competition authority, and this appears to be
because many were individually small, but cumulatively had signicant impact on
concentration.
The literature on mergers subsequent to cartel can be traced back, through Bit-
tlingmayer (1985) and Mueller (1996), to the rst great merger wave in the US at
the beginning of the 20th century, following the Sherman Act prohibition of cartels.
Something very similar was observed in the UK following the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act in the 1950s. Symeonidesextensive research (e.g. 2002) on this provides
more indirect evidence that prohibition of cartels preceded a major restructuring in
parts of the UK economy. The main implication for policy makers was highlighted
by Evenett et al. (2001, pp.1245): (V)igilance should not end with a cartelspun-
ishment, as former price-xers often try to e¤ectively restore the status quo ante by
merging or by taking other steps that lessen competitive pressures and raise prices.
More recently, two studies have returned to the topic, but at a more micro level
within a jurisdiction (the EU) in which cartels are already illegal, and where the
event is not some major natural experiment but rather the busting of individual
cartels. Kumar et al. (2013) show that for 45% of cartels reported by the EC between
2001-2010, there were mergers between the former cartelists in following years, and
that this was twice as likely in markets where buyers were fragmented rather than
concentrated. They use this to motivate their theoretical modelling of the choice
between collusion and merger when faced with buyer resistance. Hüschelrath and
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Smuda (2013) also employ a sample of EC cartels. But in their case, the merger
data do not relate directly to the cartelists, but rather the amount of aggregate
worldwide/EEA merger activity in the industries to which the cartel markets belong.
Pooling the industries, they calculate that merger activity was (up to) 83% higher
in the 3 years after than in the 3 years before cartel detection.
Our own study is based on a similar sample of EU cartels, and is motivated
by the same proposition that merger is a second best which is only pursued once
the rst best (cartel) is no longer possible, but it di¤ers in two important respects.
Kumar et als empirical objective is limited to motivating their theoretical model,
establishing whether merger after cartel varies with buyer resistance they provide
no evidence on whether mergers were more prevalent after detection than before.
The primary objective of Hüschelrath and Smuda is much closer to ours, but we
suggest that their empirical analysis is far too aggregate and casual to justify the
conclusions they draw. Their merger data relate not to the cartelists themselves,
but to all rms worldwide in the NACE 3 or 4 digit industries to which the cartel
markets belong. So for example, they employ aggregate data on mergers by all rms
worldwide in industries such as manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations or
manufacture of other chemical productsto proxy the cartel markets in Europe in
nely disaggregated markets such as Citric Acid or Vitamins. The cartel markets
often form only very small proportions of the NACE industries to which their merger
data relate. Moreover, all data are pooled across all industries/cartels, there are no
controls for mergers in industries in which there were no cartels, and their empirical
analysis is conned to simple comparisons of two aggregate gures, before and after,
without any tests of statistical signicance. Our study is less aggregate, and relates
to subsequent mergers between only the former cartelists, and addresses head-on the
methodological problem of how best to represent the counterfactual.
Section 2 draws on theory and previous literature to propose the key hypothe-
ses. Section 3 describes the data and presents some opening descriptive statistics.
Sections 4 and 5 present the main results, using survival analysis of the time series
merger data observed at market level, and identifying the sizes of rms and types
of market structure most likely to have mergers. Section 6 explores the policy im-
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plications by examining the CAs merger interventions in these markets. Section 7
concludes.
2 Restructuring after cartel breakdown
Drawing from the previous literature, this section rst identies two alternative ex-
planations for merger activity following cartel breakdown. These provide two main
hypotheses which are testable with the data at our disposal.
2.1 Two competing explanations
The anti-competitiveexplanation is that, post-cartel, the now frustrated cartelists
attempt to re-instate softcompetition. This necessitates a new market structure via
merger which is conducive to soft rather than intense competition. Soft competition
might be tacit collusion or some form of leadership, in which respective cases, the
mergers would have coordinated or unilateral e¤ects.
On the other hand, under the e¢ ciencyexplanation, the cartel breakdown has
the desired objective from the CAs perspective, leading to a change in prevailing
conduct from collusion to competition: price falls, the market restructures and mar-
ginal rms exit, and some of the exit is via acquisition by other members of the
cartel. For example in a free entry model, replacing collusion with, say, Cournot or
Bertrand competition will lead to a reduced number of rms (Sutton, 1991, section
2.2, pp.28-37), and in an asymmetric market the ones that exit are the least e¢ cient
rms (the smallest in Cournot). Alternatively, if the post-cartel equilibrium is still
tacitly collusive, price is lower than under cartel, so even in this case the likelihood
of marginal exit through merger remains.
With a well-informed and diligent CA, the latter explanation should dominate.
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2.2 The revealed preference argument
Most of the existing literature described above has focused on the anti-competitive
motive, employing what we refer to as revealed preference type reasoning.1
In principle, rms in any market choose between competing and colluding. In
turn, collusion might take the form of hard-core cartel, or it might be softer - tacit
collusion or price leadership. In order to achieve and sustain soft collusion, market
structure must be right, and this may require mergers between at least some of the
rms. The choice may be constrained by the basic demand, cost and entry conditions,
which may e¤ectively preclude any form of collusion, and the presence of the CA may
deter either cartel formation and/or anti-competitive mergers.
In the case of a cartelised market, collusion is clearly feasible, and rms have
revealed a preference for formal over tacit collusion. Thus the revealed preference
argument has two steps:
(a) The cartel solution dominates soft competition via merger. Were this not so,
rms would have opted for mergers in place of a cartel in the rst place.
(b) Once the cartel option is removed, rms turn to the second best - tacit collusion
or price leadership - and this may require restructuring through merger.
However, there are two important qualications to this logic.
2.2.1 Merger may not be necessary
First, without disputing (a), this need not imply (b): with the cartel option no longer
open, mergers may not always be necessary in order to achieve the second best of
tacit collusion.
Much of the conventional theory of collusion can be applied equally to - and
does not always distinguish between - tacit collusion and cartels. For example, the
1In addition to Kumar et al. (2013) and Hüschelrath and Smuda (2013), see Cosnita-Langlais
and Tropeano (2013) who model the choice of two rms between forming a cartel and merging
in order to facilitate subsequent collusion, when faced with a CA which optimises its policy mix
between cartel enforcement and merger control.
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basic predictions of the repeated game - that collusion is more likely the fewer is
the number of rms and the more symmetric they are - are invoked in both the
literatures on cartels and coordinated e¤ects mergers.
This raises the question of why rms sometimes choose to overtly collude when
tacit collusion is also possible and does not carry the same risk of sanctions? Har-
rington (2012) o¤ers one explanation - given symmetric rms, he shows that the
prot from tacit collusion has an upper bound which is the cartel prot, so where
the cartel option is chosen, it follows that cartel prot must exceed tacitly collusive
prots su¢ ciently comfortably to exceed the expected cost of detection.
However, given that the cartel has been chosen but is now busted, it might still
be protable and sustainable for the rms to switch to the second best, even without
merger. There is some evidence to suggest that this is exactly what happens in some
cases. Harrington (2004) refers to the idea of residual collusion, where a busted
cartel is followed by tacit collusion. Connor (2001) uses the same argument to ex-
plain what happened in the aftermath of the exposure of the Lysine cartel. A study
by Kovacic et al. (2007) on prices in the post-breakdown period for di¤erent types
of vitamins implies a simple switch to tacit collusion in some cases. They nd that
vitamin products with two conspirators continue as if the explicit conspiracy never
stopped, while products with three or four conspirators return to pre-conspiracy
pricing, or lower. This is also conrmed in an experimental setting by Fonseca and
Normann (2012), who nd that, after formal communication is no longer possible,
rmscarry on successfully colluding in small numbers cases. If this previous com-
munication is a su¢ cient condition to sustain tacit collusion, then we would expect
at least some markets to still display collusive outcomes after cartels are detected,
without any change in market conditions (structure, entry conditions, etc).
Nevertheless, there are important di¤erences between explicit and tacit collusion
the cartel has organisational and communication advantages, and without these,
collusion may not be possible. So although collusion may sometimes continue in tacit
form post-breakdown without merger, in other cases, the existing market structure
cannot support collusion without formal communication, and in those cases part
(b) of the above argument remains valid: re-structuring by merger is necessary to
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facilitate a collusive outcome given no communication, and larger numbers.
2.2.2 Cartels which die a natural death
Second, part (a) of the argument need not always apply. While this may be reason-
able if the cartel has been detected ex-o¢ cio, i.e. through the CAs own detection
activities sometimes stimulated by customer complaints, if it has already broken
down before detection by the CA (i.e. died a natural death), it follows that collu-
sion is no longer sustainable even with communication, and we can no longer infer
that cartel is preferred to merger at the time of breakdown. By extension, in these cir-
cumstances it is also unlikely that tacit collusion is sustainable either, and it follows
that merger is even more necessary.
In other words, while mergers may sometimes be unnecessary for tacit collusion
where the cartels remained e¤ective(in terms of stability and high price) at the
time of detection, they are more likely in those which had already failed.
Empirically, a frequent signal that a cartel has e¤ectively already died a natural
death is detection via a leniency application, and we exploit this fact in the following
empirics.
2.3 Testable hypotheses
This leads to the following testable hypotheses:
H1 The probability of merger will be higher in the years immediately following
cartel breakdown.
This follows from either of the competing explanations. Because cartels that have
already died before the start of the CAs investigation are not sustainable at the time
of breakdown a further specication follows:
H1a H1 is especially pronounced for cartels having died a natural death before
detection.
However,
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H2 The probability of merger is lower, ceteris paribus, in concentrated mar-
kets.
This follows because markets which are already concentrated: (i) are more likely
to be able to sustain subsequent tacit collusion without merger, (ii) will include
fewer rms, so there are fewer opportunities to merge, and (iii) are more likely to be
deterred by the fear of CA merger intervention.
This hypothesis can be rened by disaggregating concentration: in a statistical
sense, the concentration of any size distribution depends on the number of rms
(inversely) and the asymmetry in their market shares (positively)2.
H2a The probability of merger is lower in small number markets; and
H2b The probability of merger is lower in more symmetric markets.
Assuming tacit collusion is more likely where rms are of roughly equal size,
further mergers may be unnecessary for tacit collusion, but are also more likely to
be deterred for fear of CA intervention under a coordinated theory of harm.3 Where
size asymmetries are large, this implies the presence of a dominant rm and, without
the organisational advantages of the cartel, mergers may be necessary to consolidate
the leaders position.4
2For instance, measuring concentration by the conventional HHI index, it is easily shown that:
HHI =
Pn
i=1 s
2
i = (1+CV
2)=n. where n is number of rms, s is the market share of rm i and CV
is the coe¢ cient of variation (standard deviation/mean) of market shares. CV can be interpreted
as an index of size asymmetries.
3On collusion and symmetry, see, inter alia, Mason et al. (1992), Lambson (1995), Davidson
and Deneckere (1990), Pénard (1997) and Ivaldi et al. (2003). Similarly, Vasconcelos (2005) nds
that collusion is hindered by asymmetry-increasing mergers, as do Compte et al. (2002), but only
if aggregate capacity in the market is limited.
4This is the single dominance story, where collusion may work through price leadership
(Mouraviev and Rey, 2011), but others show that some level of asymmetry is conducive to collusion
(Ganslandt et al., 2012), rather than forbearance amongst a small group of equals. Mouraviev
(2011) nds that in a Bertrand setting, price leadership restores the scope for (perfect) collusion in
markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. Ganslandt et al. (2012) introduce an
indivisible cost of collusion, which one of the rms in the collusion has to bear, and which creates
an incentive for rms to make markets more asymmetric by mergers. The intuition behind this is
that the indivisible cost should be borne by a single (large) rm. In this setting rms may merge
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These are the core hypotheses of the paper, but additional institutional charac-
teristics should also be relevant, for example, the nature of the agreement and or-
ganisation of the cartel. These are devices designed to facilitate coordination within
the cartel, and without them, uncoordinated collusion may be impracticable. We
capture this empirically below by distinguishing cartels which were market-sharing
as opposed to price-xing. Some forms of market sharing (notably territorial and/or
customer allocations) are largely self-enforcing because defection is transparent, and
if so, the same should be true for tacit collusion. We also identify whether or not the
cartel had a ringleader if so, it is less likely that collusion could survive a cartel bust
and implicitly the loss of its leader to monitor and enforce, without restructuring.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
The data, as summarised in Table 7 in the Appendix, contains information on both
cartels and mergers.
3.1 The cartels
The dataset draws on decision documents published by the European Commission
(EC) since 1990. The useable sample is 84 cartels that were detected between 1984
and 2009 - the published report typically lags the date of detection by one or more
years.5
36 cartels (43%) broke down before they were detected, and most of these (31)
were detected under leniency. On average, the cartels had lasted over 8 years at
time of breakdown, and covered 84% of the market (the remainder being supplied
to increase asymmetry. Andreoli-Versbach and Franck (2013) show that in the Italian retail petrol
market price leadership work only after the market leader introduced a policy of sticky prices.
Harrington (2006) suggests that it is typically one rm who undertakes the price and quantity
monitoring tasks in a cartel.
5For this purpose, we consolidated two decision documents which cover the rubber market,
and a number of reports relating to International Container Shipping cartels. In some other cases
(notably vitamins) a single decision document relates to more than one cartel, but since these are
always in very closely related submarkets, we count them here as a single case.
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by outsiders and imports). 82% colluded on price xing and 70% employed market
sharing practices; more than half (52%) combined both practices. Bid rigging as well
as specic quota allocations were more common practice in larger cartels (with 10 or
more rms). Ringleaders were identied in one third of cartels (see Davies and De,
2013).
3.2 The mergers
The cartels involved a total of 593 rms at the dates of breakdown. Data was
collected on all mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures between former cartelists
from the same cartel.6 The sources were: (i) companies websites, in particular
annual reports, press releases, investor information, company timelines/histories,
etc.; (ii) merger decisions documents published by the European Commission;7 (iii)
National Competition Authorities (CA); and (iv) business and nancial websites (e.g.
Bloomberg, etc.).
In almost exactly half (41) of the cartels, the breakdown was followed by one
or more mergers between previous cartelists. In these, there were 128 qualifying
mergers,8 (on average 3.12 per cartel, and the mode was 1, but the distribution is
highly skewed, with as many as 19 transactions between cartelists in one extreme
case).
50% of mergers occurred within 5 years of cartel breakdown. Figure 1 plots
the cumulated number pooled across all cartels with time measured after cartel
breakdown. In aggregate (bold line), the rate of increase is higher within the rst
ve to seven years, but slows down thereafter.
The gure also disaggregates by leniency/non-leniency detection. Post-breakdown
mergers in leniency cases occur on average 43 months after cartel failure, compared
6Relevantis dened by the 3 or 4 digit NACE industry identied by the Commission in its
decision document. In fact, many of the cartel markets are much more nely dened than even the
4 digit level. In that case, the cartel market belongs to the 3 or 4 digit industry identied by the
EC, but is only a part of that industry. See also Section 6 below.
7http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/
8The dataset assembled by Kumar et.al (2013) is a subset of 55 of the cartels in our sample.
They identify mergers in 25 cases: 45% of their sample. We nd mergers in 49% of our sample.
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Figure 1: Cumulated number of mergers after cartel breakdown
to 97 months in non-leniency cases. The concavity of the curve is more pronounced
in leniency cases, and this provides an early sign that rms tend to engage in merger
activity most intensively relatively soon after breakdown especially for cartels de-
tected under leniency.
However, this nding should be treated with caution for two reasons. First, given
that the population of all rms (and thus all potential mergers) must decline over
time due to exit by acquisition, this curve does not necessarily imply concavity in
the merger rate. Second, due to variability across cartels in the year of breakdown,
there is also heterogeneity in the composition of the pool  later observations are
based on increasingly fewer cartels. These limitations motivate our use of the hazard
curve technology in the next section.9
The above statistics on cartel characteristics are familiar and typical for samples
such as this,10 but in addition, we have also collected useable data on market shares of
the individual cartelists in 64 of the cases,11 using sources such as (i) cartel and merger
decision documents published by the EC and national CAs (ii) companiesannual
9This also partly accounts for the fact that no mergers are observed in half the markets - often
these are the most recent cartels for which few post-breakdown years are observed at the time of
writing.
10See for example Levenstein and Suslow (2006), De (2010).
11The mean number of mergers per cartel is almost identical for the 64 for which we have market
share data (1.53) and the 20 for which we do not (1.50).
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reports (iii) reports and information issued by relevant trade/industry associations
and market intelligence rms/platforms (iv) business and nancial websites etc.12
Using these estimated market shares, the HHI index at the time of breakdown for
each cartel was also computed,13 as were its two constituent parts, rm numbers (n)
and the coe¢ cient of variation (CV ).
4 Empirical analysis
Werst explain why an orthodox di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) approach, comparing
post- and pre-breakdown using control markets to represent the counterfactual, will
be inappropriate. The reasons are both practical and conceptual. In this context,
prewould be either the cartel period itself, which would not be an appropriate
representation of what might happen in a competitiveworld, or the period before
cartel formation, which would require extensive historical data collection - for some
markets many decades before the availability of internet sources. Second, choice of
appropriate control markets for such a large sample is problematic. There would be
prohibitive costs in collecting comparable data, given the very disaggregated market
denitions of most cartel markets, and the absence of detailed sources such as the EC
cartel decision documents which are the key source for our cartel markets. Moreover,
the most appropriate control markets, in terms of demand and cost conditions, would
almost certainly lie within the same 3 or 4 digit industries as the cartels, and therefore
very often be populated by the same large diversied multinationals as the cartel
markets or even operate under the cartels umbrella.
Even putting aside these generic issues which confront many applications of DiD,
two further features of the present context would constrain its e¤ectiveness. First,
12The EC does not routinely report exact market share data in its decision documents, but it is
possible to infer individual market shares for most cartels, if sometimes only approximately. Firms
shares are often reported as ranges, e.g. 10-20%; in such cases we typically employ the midpoints,
subject to moderation where other information is available on an ad hoc basis. Our estimates were
also corroborated for most of the cartels, using Des (2010, pp.109-111) estimates based on similar
data and methods.
13This is computed using the shares of members in the cartel (Table 7 shows that on average
this is around 84 per cent of the market).
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the data here are right censored: the merger history in each market is only observed
up to the common year of observation (2013), whilst the start date di¤ers between
cartels, dened by their breakdowns, so we have relatively little data on more recent
cartels. Second, because we focus on mergers between the former cartelists, with
each successive merger, there are fewer rms remaining who can merge.
To address these issues we employ a methodology based on an application of
survival analysis. Survival analysis originates from health applications in which the
event of interest is time until failure (perhaps the malfunctioning of some medical
device, sometime after its original tting), here, failureis dened by merger.14 One
comparative advantage of survival models is that they allow the analysis of censored
observations. At the heart of survival analysis is the hazard (intensity) of an event
at time t given the event history and characteristics of the context. Here, time starts
at the date of cartel breakdown, the event is merger, and the context is the market.
As a hazard function is conditional on previous event history, it is an obvious tool to
be used in a situation where successive mergers leave fewer and fewer rms to merge
in the future.
The central hypothesis - more intensive merger activity after breakdown - can be
tested by examining the behaviour of the hazard curve over time. The counterfactual
in this case would be a constant hazard rate which is undisturbed by the event of
cartel breakdown. On the other hand a monotonically declining hazard rate in the
years after breakdown would indicate a stimulus to merger which then gradually
subsides over later years.
4.1 The survival model
If there was only one post-cartel merger in each market the analysis would reduce
to a standard application of single-event survival analysis requiring an examination
of the distribution of the duration between cartel breakdown and the merger, and
14Previously, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and others have successfully employed survival analy-
sis for cartel duration, where failure is naturally dened by breakdown, but our application di¤ers
from theirs in that we focus on the shape of the hazard curve, whilst accounting for the additional
problem of multiple failures (mergers) of cartels.
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the shape of the corresponding hazard curve. Any distribution that can have an
increasing, decreasing, or constant hazard function could be used for this purpose
(for example the Weibull or gamma distributions). Because of its simplicity, we
employ the Weibull distribution, for which the hazard is:
h(t) = t 1, t  0 (1)
 and  are conventionally referred to as the shape and scale parameters of the
distribution. The  parameter captures the pace of merger activity, and in cross-
industry analysis this will allow the underlying magnitude of merger activity to di¤er
between markets. If  = 1 the hazard is constant, with  < 1 it is monotonically
decreasing, and with  > 1 it is monotonically increasing. Therefore our hypothesis
that merger activity in the years immediately following cartel breakdown is more
intense can be tested by:
H0 :   1
H1 :  < 1
However, we wish to allow for multiple mergers in each market, and this requires a
modication of this model to allow for recurrent events. To illustrate, Figure 2 plots
the history of a given industry with three mergers on the central line. To allow for
recurrent events (here, subsequent mergers) the previous literature15 most commonly
uses one of two main options depending on the assumption about when individuals
(industries) are entered into the risk set (i.e. exposed to the risk of a merger). First
(shown below the central line), time is measured from the previous event. In this
case, the rst interval starts at breakdown and subsequent intervals are measured
from the preceding merger. Second, (shown above the central line), each interval is
measure from the start (cartel breakdown.)
Thus, depending on how intervals are treated, there are three alternative ways
15See Lin et al. (1989), Andersen and Gill (1982), or Prentice et al. (1981).
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Figure 2: Time measured from breakdown and time measured from previous event
of approaching our research question. Firstly, one could ignore recurrent events
and focus only on the rate at which we observe the rst merger following a cartel
(irrespective of how many mergers are to follow). We refer to this as the naive
model as it discards important information on subsequent mergers.
Secondly, in allowing for recurrent mergers one could assume that the waiting
times between mergers are independent and thus, for every merger, time scales from
the preceding event (renewed entry). This would be appropriate if every subsequent
merger is a reaction to the preceding merger and not to the cartel breakdown. As
such, this model allows for mergers to endogenously trigger subsequent mergers.16
Thirdly, one could assume that waiting times between cartel breakdown and each
merger are independent - i.e. every merger is timed from the start of the study (entry
at start). This would imply assuming that every merger - no matter how late it occurs
- is a reaction to the cartel breakdown and not to the preceding merger.
Following conventional notation in recurrent event analysis17 denote the merger
16By looking at how the probability of subsequent mergers change in light of previous merger his-
tory. For a theoretical discussion of endogeneous mergers see Qiu and Zhou (2007) or Gowrisankaran
(1999).
17For example a comprehensive treatment of recurrent event models in the area of biostatistics
is given by Cook and Lawless (2007).
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event history in any market by N(t) = fn(u) : u  tg, where n(u) is the number of
mergers in [0; t).18 We also allow for the possibility that hazard rates are a function
of market and cartel characteristics (denoted by X). Then the hazard (intensity)
function is:
hft j N(t);Xg = lim
t!0
Pr
[t  Tn(t)+1 < t+t j N(t);X]
t
(2)
By combining (1) and (2) the above three scenarios can be modelled in the fol-
lowing way:
1. Naivemodel: h(t j X) = t 1.
2. Renewed entry model: h(t j N(t);X) = (t  tn(t)) 1. This follows Andersen
and Gill (1982) and the rst model in Prentice et al. (1981).19
3. Entry at start model: h(t j N(t);X) = t 1. This model is loosely based on
the second model in Prentice et al. (1981).20
Models 2 and 3 can be thought of as setting two bounds on the estimate of 
when multiple mergers can happen in an industry. In Model 2 each industry spends
a relatively shorter time in the risk set (time starts at previous event), which means
that we are more likely to have many short spells and few long spells in the sample,
implying that  should be the lowest in these models. In Model 3 mergers that
happen later are treated as independent, therefore the analysed time spells are more
likely to be longer, implying a higher .
Now consider the implication for a sample of m industries, when the set of all
industries is fG1; G2; :::; Gmg. Denote the total number of mergers in industryGi (i =
18The counting process N(t) is equivalent of the random failure times T1 < ::: < Tn(t), and n(t)
records the cumulative number of mergers, n(t) =
P1
k=1 I(Tk  t), where Tk is the time of the k-th
merger.
19We replace the Cox PH model used in these papers by a fully parametric approach.
20Both Andersen and Gill (1982) and Prentice et al. (1981) used a stratied model. We opt
against this, as it would require estimating parameters of a baseline hazard for each industry for
each possible strata (interval), which would have been too demanding from our relatively small
sample.
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1; 2; :::;m) by ki. Allowing for right-censoring in each industry there are si = ki + 1
intervals in each industry. For each interval denote the total number of industries at
risk by ms, and the number of industries with mergers by rs.
Let ts1; ts2; :::; tsrs ; t
+
srs+1; :::; t
+
sms be the ordered failure (merger) times in interval
s,21 with
P
s1 rs exact times, and - because the study period has a natural cuto¤
point at the time of writing this study - we also have
P
s1(ms   rs) right-censored
intervals. The likelihood of observing this sequence is given by:
L =
Y
s1
hYrs
j=1
f(tj)
Yms
j=rs+1
S(t+j )
i
(3)
Where the density function f(t) represents the information that can be obtained
from observed uncensored survival times and the survival function S(t) captures
observed right-censored times.
Using theWeibull density (t 1e (t)

) and survival functions (e (t)

) together
with (3) the recurrent event, right-censored likelihood functions to be estimated for
the three models described are given below. For each model we assumed that the
sample is progressively censored (i.e. markets are entered at di¤erent times and the
study lasts a predetermined period of time).
In the naive model there is only one interval analysed, therefore the ordered
survival data is: t1  t2  :::  tr; t+r+1; :::; t+m and the likelihood of observing this
data given a Weibull distribution is:
L1 =
Yr
j=1
t 1j e
 (tj)
Ym
j=r+1
e (t
+
j )

, t > 0 (L1)
In the renewed entry model denote the gap time between two events in the same
industry by us = ts   t(s 1). In this case the ordered (observed and censored) gap
times are given by: us1  us2  :::  usrs ; u+srs+1; :::; u+sms and the likelihood function:
L2 =
Y
s1
hYrs
j=1
u 1sj e
 (usj)
Yms
j=rs+1
e (usj)

i
, t > 0 (L2)
In the entry at start model the ordered survival data is: ts1  ts2  ::: 
21For simplicity we assume that the failure process is orderly, i.e. there cannot be two mergers
in the same month.
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tsrs ; t
+
srs+1; :::; t
+
sms and the likelihood function is:
L3 =
Y
s1
hYrs
j=1
t 1sj e
 (tsj)
Yms
j=R+1
e (t
+
sj)

i
, t > 0 (L3)
As the emphasis is on estimating  initially we estimate  and  without allowing
for heterogeneity across cartels.22
4.2 Results
The MLE estimates of  for Models 1-3 are reported in Table 1.23 The Full sample
column shows that  < 1 in all three models, but only at the 90% condence level
for Model 3.
Table 1: Values of  for the full sample and leniency cases only
Full sample Leniency only
[95% CI] [95% CI]
Model 1 0.619 0.530
[0.471;0.816] [0.419;0.670]
Model 2 0.767 0.612
[0.624;0.943] [0.514;0.729]
Model 3 0.936 0.744
[0.804;1.089] [0.626;0.883]
Result 1 (H1): There is higher merger activity in the years immediately
following cartel breakdown, although the power of the test that conrms this depends
on model choice.
22Note that 1   3 di¤er from Prentice et al (1981) not only in that they are fully parametric
but also in that  and  are homogeneous across intervals. Assuming di¤erent hazard functions for
each time interval between events would mean estimating max(Ki)  2 parameters (in the model
without covariates), which we rejected for dimensionality reasons.
23The standard errors used to calculate the condence intervals are based on a robustvariance-
covariance matrix to account for the possible dependence between failure times (subsequent merg-
ers). See the Appendix for further explanation.
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However, when the model is estimated only for cartels detected under leniency
(leniency onlycolumn), MLE estimates of  are lower and signicantly less than
unity in all three models:
Result 1a (H1a) For cartels that died a natural death, there is signicantly
higher mergers activity24 in the years immediately following, and this is robust across
all model treatments.
4.3 Allowing heterogeneity across industries
The above results are conditional on the Weibull parameters being constant across
all industries. This assumption is now relaxed by allowing the underlying merger rate
to vary across industries, using an exponential link function:  = e
0xi(tj), where xi is
a vector of covariates. The model is specied such that  is constant (i.e. covariates
do not a¤ect the shape only the position of the hazard function).
To test hypothesis H2 in Section 2.3, estimates now control for market structure
(HHI, or n and CV ), the type of the cartel agreement (price xing - pf or market
sharing - ms), and whether there was a ringleader at the time of cartel breakdown
(rl). Table 2 reports estimates for the two alternative recurrent event models 2 and
3. In Variant A HHI is used as a control for market structure; this is replaced by n
and CV in Variant B.
The results for variant A in Table 2 show that estimates for the shape parameter
 remain in the same range as above, i.e. signicantly less than unity.
Result 1b (H1 and H1a): There is robust evidence of higher merger activity
following the natural death of cartels when also allowing for heterogeneity across
markets.
Since HHI has a signicantly negative coe¢ cient in all model specications:
Result 2 (H2): The underlying merger rate is lower in more concentrated
markets.
24In fact, this result holds at the 99% condence level.
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Table 2: Introducing heterogeneity
Model 2 Model 3
Variant A Variant B Variant A Variant B
HHI -7.470*** -6.586***
(1.701) (1.477)
CV 2.342*** 1.507***
(0.673) (0.488)
n 0.149*** 0.127***
(0.375) (0.035)
rl -0.312 -0.747* -0.251 -0.581**
(0.443) (0.420) (0.237) (0.261)
pf 0.515 1.410** 0.242 0.930*
(0.683) (0.620) (0.620) (0.484)
ms -0.308 -0.195 -0.228 -0.300
(0.539) (0.466) (0.269) (0.281)
_cons -0.945 -5.958*** -2.447** -6.563
(0.865) (0.905) (0.717) (0.860)
 0.582*** 0.576*** 0.778** 0.781**
(z-stat) (-5.70) (-5.93) (-2.33) (-2.20)
This may imply that rms in more concentrated markets are more likely to be
deterred from merging (as there is a higher chance of regulatory disapproval), but
it can also mean that these markets are already su¢ ciently concentrated to sustain
tacit collusion. The results do now allow us to distinguish between these two possible
explanations.
Results 2a and 2b (H2a and H2b): Market asymmetry and a larger num-
ber of rms both lead to an increased underlying merger rate.
This follows from the variant B results: in markets with symmetric structure the
merger rate is less intensive following cartel breakdown, and higher if there are more
rms in the market. These again may be due to deterrence (high symmetry and
few rms typically imply less likely merger approval) or due to the fact that these
markets are already conducive to collusion.25
25Because we were focusing on the hazard of mergers (the probability of an imminent merger
conditional on previous merger history) there was no need to control for the fact that with every
merger there are fewer rms in the market and thus the probability of mergers is reduced.
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The results on the other covariates show that in general having a previous ring-
leader in the cartel reduces the rate of mergers following cartel breakdown, and that
market sharing cartels have higher merger rates after the cartel. These results are
robust across all specications.26
5 Mergers: competitive consequence or second-
best collusion?
These results support both main hypotheses of section 2.3, but they cannot dis-
criminate between the two competing explanations - e¢ ciency or anti-competitive.
In any cross-section as such, it is likely that the relative strengths of the two will
vary between cases, and this will be examined in future work on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, a preliminary screening is possible here making use of the data we have
collected on the individual mergers and market shares of merging rms.
As explained earlier, such data are available for 72 of the mergers in 64 of the
cartels.27 In order not to attach undue reliance on market share estimates of smaller
rms, we employ a simple dichotomy: distinguishing the two largest, leading, rms
from the others for each of these cartels. Using information only on the shares of the
two leaders (S1 and S2), three types of market structure can be distinguished:
 If S1 > 0:5 single dominance(SD)
26In a slightly modied set of models we controlled for the ordering of susequent mergers by
including a covariate counting the number of previous mergers. Estimates remain in the same
region. These results are available on request from the authors.
27In addition to the mergers for which we have no market share data, we also exclude 29 mergers
for which closer investigation reveals that there was no direct impact on market shares in the
cartel markets as precisely dened by the EC. This reects a feature of how the data for the merger
database was collected we identied all mergers between previous members of a given cartel, where
the merger occurred within the NACE industry to which the cartel market belonged. However, often
the cartel market, as identied by EC, was more disaggregated than the NACE industry to which
it belongs. Thus these 29 mergers (or joint ventures/transfers of assets) were conned to the rms
activities in another country/product line than the specic market in which the cartel was detected.
These are excluded for present purposes but merit attention in future research - on the possibility
that the EC may have dened the cartels product market or geographic reach too narrowly, or
lacked hard evidence that the cartel had a wider reach.
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 If S1 < 0:5 but S1 + S2 > 0:5; collective dominance(CD)
 If S1 + S2 < 0:5; no dominance(ND)
This typology corresponds broadly with traditional denitions of market domi-
nance often used in the competition policy literature.
Tables 3 and 4 report the frequencies of merger by rm types, and cartels by mar-
ket structures respectively, and they provide the following four descriptive insights.
Table 3: Participants in mergers by market share
Larger rm in merger
Leading rm* Others** Total
Other rm Leading rm 7 (2)
in merger Others 36 (29) 29 (41) 65 (70)
Total 43 (31)
Figures in parentheses are expectations on the null that there is no association
between rm identity and propensity to merge, using the mean number of
leaders (2) and others (6.3) per cartel.
Finding 1: Leading rms are disproportionately more involved in mergers.
According to the e¢ ciency explanation, we would expect most exit by acquisition
to involve marginal rms, and if merger control deters large rms from merger, we
would expect few to involve leaders. However, assuming that marginalrms are
typically from the othergroup, the results in Table 3 o¤er little support for these
expectations. There were 7 mergers between the two leaders in a previous cartel;
and where one of the parties was an other, more often than not its partner was
a leader rather than another other(36 compared to 29). More formally, if these
observed frequencies are compared with expectations based on a null hypothesis of
no association between rm type and propensity to merge, the null is rejected at the
0.05 level.
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Finding 2: Most markets include dominant rms at the time of breakdown.
Table 4 reveals that in 60% (39/64) of the cartel markets, there was dominance
by either the leading (SD) or, more often, the two leading rms (CD) at the date of
breakdown. This is unsurprising - cartelised markets tend to be concentrated - but
it nevertheless highlights that mergers in markets such as this would usually attract
the attention of competition agencies - even without knowledge of any prior cartel
activity.
Table 4: Mergers by market structure, and their impact
Structure after mergers
Structure at Number of Number of cartels SD CD ND
breakdown cartels with mergers
SD 6 1 6
CD 33 11 1 32
ND 25 20 8 17
total 64 32 7 40 17
Finding 3: Mergers are less frequent in markets with dominant rms, but
nevertheless still occur in 30% of such cases.
There were mergers in 80% of the ND markets, but in only 33% of the CD mar-
kets, and 1 SD market (Table 4 column 2). This is consistent with the results on
concentration from the survival analysis, and is broadly consistent with the deter-
rence expectation. Nevertheless, there were mergers in 12 of the markets with already
dominant rms, and close CA scrutiny would be expected in those cases.
Finding 4: Mixed evidence on the likely impact on market structure.
The last three columns of Table 4 are in transition matrix form, showing how the
mergers would impact on the structure of the market, if not intervened by the CA.28
28Post-merger market shares and structures are computed following conventional CA practice
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(In those markets where there was more than one merger, this is their cumulated
e¤ect.)
As already noted there were mergers in 20 of the 25 markets which were ND at
the time of breakdown. Of these in 12 the impact was insu¢ cient to create dominant
rms, but in 8 the e¤ect would be to move the market to collective dominance. It
is these 8 markets which, at least potentially, correspond to the anti-competitive
explanation of merger activity, and which conict with the expectation that the
threat of CA intervention will be su¢ cient to deter such mergers.29
6 The response from competition authorities
It is not the primary purpose of the current paper to exhaustively evaluate the ECs
merger control subsequent to cartel investigation, but both Findings 3 and 4 would
lead us to expect considerable CA merger control activity in a number of markets
(those involving already dominant rms or creating dominance.) Therefore, we have
identied how many mergers were actually investigated by the Commission, and
what were its decisions (Table 5).
In fact, only half (41) of the 83 mergers for which we have su¢ cient market share
data were investigated by the EC or a national CA30. Of these, most (34) were cleared
without remedies, and of the 7 where remedies were agreed, only 1 had any impact
on the cartel market, whilst the other 6 only impacted on the partiesactivities in
other markets.
The table reveals that this relative inactivity is largely explicable by the small
in merger investigations - the market share of a newly merged rm is assumed to be the combined
shares of the two merging parties. This is subject to two obvious qualications: (i) most oligopoly
theory suggests that following merger, any nearly merged rm will raise price and contract scale
rather than maintain it at the combined pre-merging scales of the parties, (ii) we abstract from any
other changes in market structure which are independent of the merger.
29The Table also shows that there is one market in which there was already CD, but mergers
would increase the share of the larger leader, such that it would become SD.
30For this part of the analysis, we also include 13 cement mergers. These were excluded from
previous Tables, because we were unable to estimate the market shares for all rms, and therefore
the cartel HHI. However, we do know the shares of the merging parties, and this is su¢ cient to
compute the change in HHI.
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Table 5: Merger investigations by the EC
HHI > 250 HHI < 250
Total mergers 83 21 62
Investigated 41 11 30
by EC 25
of which: cleared 18 3 15
remedied 7 4 3
by national CA 16
of which: cleared 16 4 12
remedied 0
Uninvestigated 42 10 32
of which: below turnover
threshold 36 10 26
no turnover
information 6 6
size of most of the mergers. Nearly all, or perhaps all31 of the 42 un-investigated
mergers involved a turnover below the ECs minimum disclosure threshold, and in 30
of the 41 cases which were investigated, the increase in concentration implied by the
merger would have been lower than the level identied in the ECs merger guidelines
as signicant (HHI<250).32
These ndings are at least supercially encouraging (for the CAs), but they seem
to be inconsistent with ndings 3 and 4. However, the explanation becomes clear by
focusing on 8 markets in which mergers introduced collective dominance where pre-
viously it was absent, and one where single dominance replaced collective dominance
(Table 6).
Here, intervention was indeed minimal: of the 24 mergers, only 7 were investigated
and only 1 required a remedy. However, as can be seen, these were multi-merger
markets (on average 2.67 per market), and the changes in structure recorded in
Table 4 reect the combined e¤ect of all mergers in each market. While all 17
31In Table 5, we have been unable to identify the aggregate turnovers of the parties in 6 mergers,
and it is likely that none of these was large; if so, all 42 un-investigated mergers were below the
EC turnover threshold.
32Computed from our estimates of the market shares of the merging parties.
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Table 6: Cartels in which mergers moved the market towards collective dominance
Cartel Mergers Investigated Outcome Uninvestigated Below turnover HHI < 250
threshold
Copper Fittings 3 0 3 3 3
Industrial Thread 5 0 5 5 2
Copper Plumbing Tubes 3 1* cleared 2 2 1
Specialty Graphite 2 0 2 2 2
Lux. Brewers 2 0 2 2 1
Carbonless Paper 1 0 1 1 0
Alloy Surcharge 2 2 cleared 0 0 0
Ferry Operators 3 2** cleared 1 1 0
UK Tractors 3 2*** remedy 1 1 1
Total 24 7 17 17 10
* This was the last of the three mergers which triggered the move from ND to CD, but HHI < 250.
** This was initially picked up as an antitrust case and the EC granted exemption for the JV which it
later renewed before nally approving the concentration.
*** The remedy was a large divestment (approx. 1/3 of acquired company) to new entrant.
un-investigated mergers was smallrelative to the ECs turnover threshold, taken
together their e¤ect was to reinforce the dominance of leading rms. Moreover, in
7 of the 17, we estimate that, even when treated separately, the merger had more
than a trivial impact on concentration (HHI>250). This evidently occurs in those
cases where the cartel market, often dened very narrowly, is small relative to the
merger size threshold.
7 Conclusions and directions for further research
The main nding of this paper is a conrmation that after a cartel breaks down,
typically, there is increased merger activity amongst the former cartelists. This evi-
dence therefore reinforces the more aggregate historical evidence drawing on natural
experiments of periods when cartels became prohibited. The novelty of the paper
lies not so much with the headline result, but more with the application of survival
curves to handle the problem that we have di¤ering post-cartel periods for di¤erent
cartels and that for some at least no mergers have yet been observed.
The increased merger activity post breakdown is most pronounced in those cartels
which are detected under leniency. In that these are failedcartels this might be
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evidence that rms use merger to re-instate a structure which facilitates (now tacit)
collusion. Similarly a disproportionately high number of acquisitions are undertaken
by the leading rms.
Nevertheless, the ndings of the paper could be consistent with either the e¢ -
ciency explanation cartel breakdown sti¤ens competition and this forces weaker
rms to exit or a collusive explanation with the cartel option denied, rms strive
for tacit collusion via merger. A more detailed look at market share changes caused
by mergers suggests that both explanations might be at work in some markets, how-
ever, on balance they point towards the anti-competitiveexplanation.
Turning to the papers policy relevance, a cross-market study of as many di¤erent
markets as this is not well-suited to denitive conclusions, and the purpose of the
paper was not to conduct an exhaustive evaluation of the e¢ cacy of EC merger
control. Future in-depth case analysis will be required for that purpose.
Nevertheless, some relevant results have emerged. Of particular interest are the
markets where post-breakdown merger activity is least pronounced (or even non-
existent). These tend to be highly concentrated, with only a few relatively symmetric
rms. This could be because second best tacit collusion is already attainable without
merger. But it could be that rms in such markets are deterred from proposing
mergers which they know will be blocked. However, deterrence does not seem to
have been e¤ective in the subset of markets in which mergers did occur and appear
to have resulted in a structure where the leading rms emerged as dominant. In a
number of the markets, mergers are relatively frequent, and, although each one might
be small, they do involve the leading rms, and when taken together their combined
e¤ect is to increase dominance. Supercially at least, this tends to undermine the
deterrence argument. It also points to a doubt concerning the use of size thresholds
in merger control: a sequence of relatively small mergers may have a signicant
deadening impact on competition, even although none in itself seems signicant.
This possibility is particularly pronounced where the markets themselves are small
as is the case for many cartels.
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A Obtaining MLE of  and 
For Model 1 the MLE of  and  can be obtained following procedures on parametric
censored survival models, such as Lee and Wang (2003, p.178). In previous literature
we did not nd derivation of the MLE of the two Weibull parameters in the two
recurrent-event models used in this paper therefore we briey report how the Model
3 estimates were obtained (Model 2 is derived analogously but time is measured by
us = ts   t(s 1)).
Denote the set of estimable parameters by  = f; g, then the loglikelihood
function is given by :
l3() =
X
s1
(
rs ln() + rs ln()+Prs
j=1 [(  1) ln(tsj)  (ts)] 
Pms
j=rs+1
(t+sj)

)
For l3() the MLE of  and  can be obtained by solving the following two
equations simultaneously:
X
s1
nrs

+
Xrs
j=1
 1tsj  
Xms
j=rs+1
 1t+sj

o
= 0X
s1

rs

+
Xrs
j=1
ln(tsj)  (tsj) ln(tsj) 
Xms
j=rs+1
(t+sj)
 ln(t+sj)

= 0
There is no closed solution for this system so iterative techniques a lá Newton-
Raphson were used.
The 95% condence intervals given in Table 1 were obtained using:
[b  Z0:025pv; b+ Z0:025pv]
and
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[b  Z0:025pv;b+ Z0:025pv]
where Z0:025 is the 0.975 percentile point of the standard normal distribution.
v and v are the two diagonal elements of an adjusted covariance matrix. Lin
(1994) showed that the covariance matrix given by I 1 =  @2l(b)=@@0 does not
take into account the additional correlation in the data due to the potential lack of
independence among mergers in the same industry. Therefore it is not appropriate
for testing or constructing condence intervals for recurrent event data. Lin and Wei
(1989) proposed dealing with this in the following way.
Divide the sample into m industries fG1; G2; :::; Gmg, and denote the matrix of
the group e¢ cient score residuals by G, which has dimensions m 2 because there
are m industries and 2 parameters to be estimated. Then the robust covariance
matrix is given by:
V = I 1G0GI 1
B Additional tables
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics
Cartels Mean Std. dev. Min Max
no. of cartel members at breakdown 7.07 5.114 2 32
cartel duration (years) 8.32 6.42 0 34.8
coverage (cartel share of market) 0.842 0.166 0.22 1
HHI at cartel breakdown (64 cartels only) 0.292 0.136 0.078 0.844
CV at cartel breakdown (64 cartels only) 0.714 0.338 0.094 1.958
Proportions
cartels with ringleaders 0.333
price xing cartels 0.819
bid rigging cartels 0.217
market sharing cartels 0.699
cartels detected under leniency 0.714
Frequencies of mergers:
Cartels followed by
No mergers 43
1 merger 14
2 mergers 8
3 mergers 8
4+ mergers 11
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Table 8: List of post-breakdown Mergers, Acquisitions and Joint Ventures
Cartel Year of Merger Firm 1 in Merger Firm 2 in Merger
CRT Glass 2008 Asahi Glass Schott
LCD 2008 LG Philipps Hannstar
Airfreight 2011 KLM Martinair
2008 Japan Airlines Quantas
Prestressing Steel 2005 Companhia Previdente Italcables
2004 Companhia Previdente Emesa-Trelería/Industrias Galycas
DRAM 2002 Mitsubishi Hitachi
2003 Inneon Nanya
2003 Elpida Mitsubishi
2003 Mitsubishi Toshiba
2003 Samsung Toshiba
2008 Micron Inotera (Inneon/Nanya)
2011 Hynix Toshiba
2013 Micron Elpida
Power Transformers 2003 Siemens Alstom
2004 Areva Alstom
2009 Areva Siemens
2010 Alstom Schneider/Areva
Removal Service 2007 Team Relocations Arthur Pierre
Paran Wax 2007 Eni Exxon
2007 Sasol Shell
GIS 2005 Siemens VA Tech
2007 Mitsubishi Areva
2008 Schneider Fuji
2010 Alstom Areva
Rubber 2006 Bayer Dow
Hydrogen Peroxide 2001 FMC Degussa
2001 Degussa Edison SpA / Ausimont
2002 Solvay Ausimont
2002 Degussa Edison SpA / Ausimont
2003 Kemira (Polargas) Air Liquide
2012 Solvay Air Liquide
Copper Fittings 2002 Aalberts Yorkshire (IMI)
2005 Aalberts Pegler/Tomkins
2006 Aalberts Legris / Comap
Bitumen Netherlands 2002 BAM HBG
Raw Tobacco Italy 2005 Dimon Transcatab
MCAA 1999 Akzo Hoechst
Industrial Thread 1999 Coats Hicking Pentecost (Barbour )
2000 Coats Dollfus/Donisthorpe
2001 Amann Donisthorpe
2000 Guetermann Zwicky
2008 Amann Oxley
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Cartel Year of Merger Firm 1 in Merger Firm 2 in Merger
Copper Plumbing Tubes 2001 Outokumpu Boliden
2002 KME IMI
2002 Boliden HME
2003 Outokumpu Boliden
Sorbates 2002 Daicel Hoechst Nanning
Carbon and Graphite 1999 Schunk Ho¤mann & Co
Specialty Graphite 2002 SGL Tokai
2005 Carbone Lorraine NSCC
Plasterboard 2002 Lafarge BPB
2002 BPB Gyproc BeNeLux
2011 Knauf Lafarge
Food Flavour Enhancers 2006 Takeda Deasang
Dutch Industrial Gases 1998 Air Liquide BOC
1999 Air Liquide BOC
2000 Air Products AGA
2001 Air Liquide Messer
2001 Air Products Messer
2002 Air Liquide BOC
2004 Air Liquide Messer
2007 Air Products BOC
Austrian Banks 1999 ÖVAG NÖ Landesbank-Hypothekenbank
2000 BAWAG PSK
Vitamins 2000 BASF Takeda
2001 Sumitomo Aventis
2002 Takeda Sumitomo
Sodium Gluconate 1995 Avebe Akzo
Luxemburg Brewers 2000 Diekirch Les brasseries réunies (Mousel)
2005 Nationale-Bo¤erding Battin
Graphite Electrodes 2002 SGL Tokai
German Banks 2002 Commerzbank Dresdner Bank
2009 Commerzbank Dresdner Bank
Carbonless Paper 1998 AWA Bollore
Shipping Agreements 1993 TMM Tacomar
1994 Senator DSR
1996 P&O Nedlloyd
1997 Hanjin Senator
1999 Maersk Land-Sea Service
2003 MISC NOL
2005 Maersk P&O Nedlloyd
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Cartel Year of Merger Firm 1 in Merger Firm 2 in Merger
Seamless Steel Tubes 1997 Mannesmann Vallourec
2002 NKK Kawasaki
2012 Nippon Steel Sumitomo Metal
Pre-insulated pipe 1997 Logostor Pan Isovit
1999 Logostor Tarco
2009 Logostor Dansk Rorindustri (Starpipe)
British Sugar 2004 Napier James Bugett
Alloy Surcharge 1996 Krupp Acciai Speciali Terni
2000 Krupp Thyssen Usinor
Ferry Operators 1996 P&O North Sea
1998 P&O Stena
2002 P&O Stena
Steel Beam 1997 Aceralia (Empresa) Siderúrgica Aristrain
1997 Arbed Empresa Nacional
1999 Thyssen Krupp Hoesch
PVC 1997 BASF Hoechst
1998 Wacker Huels
1999 Solvay BASF
2000 BASF Shell
2002 Solvay Montedison (Edison / Ausimont)
Cement 1990 Aalborg Blue Circle
1992 Italcementi Ciments Français
1993 Heidelberger SA Cimenteries CBR
1993 Heidelberger NV-ENCI
1994 Holderbank Cedest
1994 Dyckerho¤ Ciments Luxembourgeois
1995 Unicem Italcementi
1995 EUROC AB Aker A/S (Norcem)
1996 Heracles Halkis
1997 Alsen-Breitenburg Nordcement
1999 Heidelberger Aker / Scancem
1999 Fratelli (Buzzi) Unicem
1999 Blue Circle Heracles
2001 Lafarge Blue Circle
2003 Holcim Hispacement
2004 Buzzi-Unicem Dyckerho¤
2004 Cementir Aalborg
2004 Irish Cement / CRH SECIL
2007 Heidelberger Hanson
Carton Board 1992 Mayr-Melnhof Laakmann Karton GmbH
1994 Enso-Gutzeit Tampella Española (Enso)
1998 Stora Enso-Gutzeit
2001 Mayr-Melnhof Gruber & Weber GmbH
UK Tractors 1991 Fiat Ford New Holland
1995 Same-Lamborghini Deutz-Fahr
1999 New Holland (Fiat) Case
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